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Commentators have observed that the field of private international law 
is mired in the past.  To update and adapt to an increasingly interconnected 
world, it should consider how other fields of international dispute 
resolution have changed to the evolving face of globalization in the past 
decade. 
Private international law has been traditionally limited to developing 
rules to decide the proper forum and applicable law for transnational 
disputes, and to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in municipal courts.  The result is a field of mechanical rules 
that point parties to the right court and the proper law, with little regard to 
what that court does or what that law says.  It has served the role of an 
international prothonotary – a mere guidepost for transnational actors 
seeking justice on the international plane. 
This may have been sufficient in centuries past, where “international” 
discourse was largely limited to regional interactions among legal systems 
of similar traditions and competencies.  But, in the last few decades, that 
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discourse has become truly global.  In U.S. federal courts, there were only 
15 published opinions addressing proof of foreign law between 1966 and 
1971, covering the laws of 12 different foreign countries. In the past five 
years, there have been more than 125 published decisions, covering the 
laws of approximately 50 foreign countries. The increased number of cases 
is mirrored by the increased range and complexity of the foreign laws at 
issue—from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, Nicaragua and Iraq. 
Of course, all of these foreign states unilaterally proclaim themselves 
to be un Estado de derecho, but these are often mere words.  All too often, 
“[t]he more dictatorial the regime, the more surrealistically gorgeous” its 
laws.1  The reality is that adherence to basic notions of justice is still a 
startling anomaly in today’s world.2  With this in mind, the field of private 
international law must stop worrying about mechanical methods and 
grammatical texts, and begin operating in realistic contexts.  Too often this 
discipline is over-concerned with the applicability of laws, but not the 
validity of laws; with proper methodology, but not judicious results.  This 
article proposes that, in order to play a meaningful role in the resolution of 
modern transnational disputes, the field of private international law must 
play a meaningful role in explicating the substance of those municipal laws 
applied to the transnational scenario. 
The means by which this explication may occur is nothing new within 
the field of international law writ large.  For over a century international 
judges have observed that there are certain minimum, corrective principles 
inherent in every legal system.  These “general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations” derive from the consensus of municipal 
legal systems in foro domestic, and while they are grounded in the positive 
law of nation states, they rest alongside custom and treaties as a primary 
source of international law.  They seek to define the fundamentals of 
substantive justice and procedural fairness, and have been applied by the 
International Court of Justice, international investment tribunals, and 
commercial arbitration panels time and again to reach judicious results 
when the applicable law otherwise would not.  Taken together, these 
general principles form an emerging notion of international due process by 
which local legal processes are judged beyond their own sovereign borders.  
Just as they do on the international plane, these general principles can play 
a material role when a transnational case comes to a municipal court. 
Applying these principles to inform the proper choice of law; to assist 
 
 1.  Jan Paulsson, Enclaves of Justice 1, (University of Miami Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 2010-29), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1707504. 
 2.  See id. (referring to the “Fraudulent Consensus on the Rule of Law”). 
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in the interpretation and application of that law; or to assess the adequacy 
of a foreign judicial decision under a truly international standard; falls 
squarely within the bailiwick of private international law.  Scholars, 
advocates, and judges operating in this field should take heed of these 
universal principles of law in cases that incorporate a foreign element; they 
should explicate them and apply them to achieve a result that is not only 
fair to the parties, but one that also advances minimum international 
standard of justice more generally.  This trend may have already started, 
but it should be encouraged to continue, in order to move private 
international law alongside other disciplines of international dispute 
resolution. 
I. THE RECURRING HYPOTHETICAL AND THE INFLUENCE OF 
PROFESSOR BIN CHENG 
The annals of legal history are full of recurring tales.  On the 
international plane, perhaps the most common is the nationalization decree 
used to expropriate foreign investment.  We can crib the facts from any 
number of recent cases, or take them from the tomes of centuries past, but 
perhaps the best hypothetical was written by Jan Paulsson in a 2009 
article.3  It goes something like this: 
Rex has recently installed himself as the benevolent dictator of a 
resource-rich country.  He took power from a government he accuses of 
having distributed national wealth in a grossly unfair manner, and he 
enjoys passionate popularity among the vast disadvantaged segments of the 
population.  He accuses foreign business interests of having colluded with 
formerly powerful national elites.  In pursuit of his policies, Rex decides to 
abrogate international treaties and rewrite national laws.  With that, he also 
decides to nullify contracts made with foreign investors and expropriate 
foreign assets in the name of redistributive justice.  His political majority 
will support him, as will the legislators and judges he has hand-picked for 
office.  Rex insists that he respects the rule of law, but by “law” he means 
the rules he has put into place to further his policies.4  A legal action by an 
aggrieved foreign investor under that law may be futile.5  This is not only 
because Rex’s courts are often packed with his cronies, but also because 
any court that applies Rex’s laws as they are drafted and enacted will be 
obliged to reach the same conclusion.  And the discipline of private 
 
 3.  Jan Paulsson, Unlawful Laws and the Authority of International Tribunals, 23 ICSID Rev.—
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 215, 221-22 (2008). 
 4.  For a further discussion of “the law” as opposed to mere “laws,” see infra note 146. 
 5.  See Paulsson, supra note 4, at 221-22. 
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international law, as it is traditionally conceived, reflexively points to 
Rex’s laws as the rule of decision in transnational cases.  Rex thus has free 
reign to abrogate his international contracts, even contracts to arbitrate,6 by 
the stroke of a pen. 
International law has had to develop the mechanisms to deal with the 
“Rex’s” of the world.  For a time, these types of disputes were left to the 
discretion of negotiating sovereigns, who would espouse an investor’s 
international claims against other states.  Modern bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) changed all that.  Private companies no longer depend on 
the discretion of their home states in the context of diplomatic protection as 
to whether a claim should be raised against another state.7  They can bring 
an international claim against their host sovereign themselves.8  But, in 
some respects, all sovereigns are similar to Rex.  They all find it 
intolerable, or at least inconvenient, that an external authority could be 
allowed to determine what is lawful or unlawful in their own territory.9  So, 
as a choice of law limitation, most BITs point to applying the respondent 
state’s law when an investment tribunal is asked to adjudicate its breach of 
contract with a covered investor.  The investor is thus protected against the 
 
 6.  See, e.g., Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 499 F. Supp. 2d 452, 461, 463, 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that “extensive formalities” for state-contracting and an Ecuadorian 
Constitutional provision prohibiting state-owned entities from submitting to a “foreign jurisdiction” 
precluded any reasonable reliance on a contract—and its arbitration clause—that had been followed by 
the contracting parties for over two decades); cf. Bitúmenes Orinoco S.A. v. New Brunswick Power 
Holding Corp., No. 05 Civ. 9485(LAP), 2007 WL 485617, at *18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2007) 
(refusing, for lack of proof, a state-owned entity’s attempt to free itself from a contract to arbitrate by 
pointing to a Venezuelan law that stripped its board of directors from any authority to enter into the 
contract). 
 7.  See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Arbitration of Foreign Investment Disputes – An Introduction, in 
NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND 125, 125-31 (Albert Jan 
van den Berg ed., 2005); JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 1-15 (1999); M. SORNARAJAH, THE 
SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 61-84 (2000). 
 8.  There are presently over 2,000 bilateral and regional investment treaties that provide for the 
compulsory arbitration of investment disputes between investors and their host state.  During the 1990s, 
roughly 1,500 BITs were concluded, and the inclusion of states’ consents to investment arbitration 
became the norm.  This wave of new treaties were not confined to the conventional relationship 
between capital-exporting and capital-importing states; developing states, too, began to sign investment 
treaties among themselves.  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trends in 
International Investment Agreements: An Overview 33-34, U.N. Doc. UNTAD/ITE/IIT/13 (1999).  
Cases and controversies soon followed; from 1995 to 2004, ICSID registered four times as many claims 
as in the previous 30 years, and the growth trend appears to be sustaining.  This is only a snapshot of the 
explosion of investment arbitration because ICSID is only one forum for these disputes.  Other forums, 
such as the ICC’s International Court of Arbitration or ad hoc tribunals established under the 
UNCITRAL Rules, are also available for investor-state disputes, and these fora normally keep cases 
confidential unless both disputing parties agree otherwise. 
 9.  See Paulsson, supra note 4, at 222. 
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inherent bias of Rex’s legal process, but not from the bias of Rex’s “laws” 
themselves. 
So international law has taken the next logical step and developed a 
safety valve for dealing with Rex’s “laws.”  An international tribunal’s 
authority to determine and apply national law is plenary, so it is proper for 
it to refuse to apply “unlawful laws.”10  The mechanism by which it does 
this varies, but one common approach is to apply “general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations” as a corrective norm.  There is a real 
convergence of certain long-standing and baseline principles of contract, 
procedure, causation, and liability in the municipal laws of the world, 
regardless of the one-off decrees that are passed for political expediency.  
The principles become “general” principles, and thus a primary source of 
international law, when they are deemed “universally recognized” by most 
civilized legal systems.11  Once divined, these principles will “prevail over 
domestic rules that might be incompatible with them,” such that “the law of 
the host state can be applied” where there is no conflict, but “[s]o too can 
[universal principles] be applied” to correct or supplant those national laws 
that are in disharmony with minimum international standards.12  So where, 
for instance, an international investment tribunal accepts that Egyptian law 
is the proper law of the contract, it may likewise conclude that “Egyptian 
law must be construed so as to include such principles [and the] national 
laws of Egypt can be relied upon only in as much as they do not contravene 
said principles.”13  The goal is to produce decisions that are grounded in 
positive law, but still detached from the constraints of domestic dogmatism 
 
 10.  Id. at 224. 
 11.  See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1953); Vladimir-Djuro Degan, General Principles of Law 
(A Source of General International Law), 3 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 46 (1992); Wolfgang Friedmann, 
The Uses Of “General Principles” in the Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 
280-81 (1963); Michael D. Nolan and Frédéric G. Sourgens, Issues of Proof of General Principles of 
Law in International Arbitration, 3 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 505, 505 (2009). 
 12.  Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on 
Application for Annulment, ¶¶ 40-44 (Feb. 5, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 933 (2002); accord Amco v. Republic of 
Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Award, ¶ 40 (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413 (1993) 
(“applicable host-state laws . . . must be checked against international laws, which will prevail in case 
of conflict”). 
 13.  Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/3, Award, ¶ 84 (May 20, 1992), 8 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 328, 352 (1993) 
(“When . . . international law is violated by the exclusive application of municipal law, the Tribunal is 
bound . . .  to apply directly the relevant principles and rules of international law. . . . [S]uch a process 
‘will not involve the confirmation or denial of the validity of the host State’s law, but may result in not 
applying it where that law, or action taken under that law, violates international law” (quoting A. 
Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 331, 342 (1972))). 
KOTUBY MACRO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2013  6:02 PM 
416 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:411 
and the idiosyncrasies of local law; for tribunals to display the same sort of 
“pragmatic functionality” that brings disputing parties to international 
arbitration in the first place.14 
One good example is the case of World Duty Free Company Ltd. v. 
The Republic of Kenya.15  In 1989, a UK company had concluded an 
agreement with the government for the construction, maintenance, and 
operation of duty-free complexes at the Nairobi and Mombassa airports.  
Later, as alleged by Claimant, the government sought to cover-up a 
massive internal fraud by expropriating and liquidating Claimant’s local 
assets, including its rights under the 1989 Agreement.  Claimant sought, 
inter alia, restitution for breach of the contract, which awkwardly 
referenced both Kenyan and English law as the governing law. 
Kenya defended on the basis that the 1989 Agreement was “tainted 
with illegality” and thus unenforceable because it was procured upon the 
payment of a USD 2 million bribe from the Claimant to the former 
President of Kenya.  Claimant did little to rebut the factual basis for that 
defense, but instead argued that “it was routine practice to make such 
donations in advance of doing business in Kenya” and that “said practice 
had cultural roots” in Kenya and was “‘regarded as a matter of protocol by 
the Kenyan people.’”16  “[S]ufficient regard to the domestic public policy,” 
Claimant argued, required the Tribunal to uphold the contract 
notwithstanding the bribe.17 
The Tribunal first divined, and then applied, “an international 
consensus as to universal standards and accepted norms of conduct that 
must be applied in all fora.”18  After surveying arbitral jurisprudence, a 
number of international conventions, decisions of domestic courts, and 
various domestic laws, the Tribunal concluded that “bribery or influence 
peddling . . . are sanctioned by criminal law in most, if not all, countries.”19  
As a result, this consensus could be considered a general principle of 
English and Kenyan law, so “it is thus unnecessary for this Tribunal to 
consider the effect of a local custom which might render legal locally what 
 
 14.  See Klaus Peter Berger, General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration: 
How to Find Them—How to Apply Them, 5 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 97, 105-06 (2011); see 
also Yves Derains, The Application of Transnational Rules in ICC Arbitral Awards, 5 WORLD ARB. & 
MEDIATION REV. 173, 193 (2011) (noting a “trend among international arbitrators which seeks to 
challenge the adequacy of applying national laws when resolving transnational disputes”). 
 15.  ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (Oct. 4, 2006). 
 16.  Id. ¶¶ 110, 120, 134. 
 17.  Id. ¶ 120. 
 18.  Id. ¶ 139. 
 19.  Id. ¶ 142. 
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would otherwise violate transnational public policy.”20  Even “[i]f it had 
been necessary,” the Tribunal noted, it would have been “minded to 
decline . . .  to recognise any local custom in Kenya purporting to validate 
bribery committed by the Claimant in violation of international public 
policy.”21  The Tribunal cited a similar approach taken by the UK House of 
Lords in Kuwait v Iraqi Airways, which is discussed below.  Thus, 
“Claimant is not legally entitled to maintain any of its pleaded claims in 
these proceedings on the ground of ex turpi causa non oritur action,” the 
general principle of law that “[n]o court will lend its aid to a man who 
founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act.”22 
Similar facts were presented in Inceysa Vallisoletana v. El Salvador, 
and the tribunal also decided the case in a similar fashion.23  In Inceysa, a 
Spanish company signed a contract to provide industrial services to the 
Republic of El Salvador.  It alleged before an ICSID Tribunal that the 
Republic breached that contract and expropriated its rights under it.  For its 
part, El Salvador alleged that the Claimant only procured the contract 
through fraud, and therefore cannot claim any protections under the 
relevant BIT.  But the Claimant had two separate decisions of the Supreme 
Court of El Salvador that sustained the legality of the bidding process for 
the contract; it alleged that those decisions were res judicata on the issue of 
Claimant’s alleged fraud. 
The Tribunal agreed that the legality of the contract depended upon 
the “laws and governing legal principles in El Salvador.”24  Primary among 
those laws was the relevant BIT, which was incorporated into domestic law 
by the Constitution, and provides for the application of “international law” 
to disputes regarding foreign investments.25  Because “the general 
principles of law are an autonomous or direct source of international law,” 
the Tribunal held that they may be applied as “general rules on which there 
is international consensus” and “rules of law on which the legal systems of 
[all] States are based.”26 
While res judicata is one of those general principles, and decisions of 
the El Salvadorian Supreme Court should usually be binding when the 
applicable law is that of El Salvador, the Tribunal decided the issue of its 
 
 20.  Id. ¶ 172. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. ¶¶ 179, 181. 
 23.  Inceysa Vallisoletana v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award (Aug. 2, 2006), 
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0424_0.pdf. 
 24.  Id. ¶ 218. 
 25.  Id. ¶¶ 219-24. 
 26.  Id. ¶ 227. 
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own competence without limitation from the national judgments.  
Reviewing the legality of the investment contract de novo, the Tribunal 
concluded that Claimant violated at least three general principles of law in 
its procurement.  First, it violated the “supreme principle” of good faith, 
which, in the context of contractual relations, requires the “absence of 
deceit and artifice in the negotiation and execution of [legal] 
instruments.”27  Second, it violated the principle of nemo auditor propiam 
turpitudinem allegans, which means that it cannot “seek to benefit from an 
investment effectuated by means of [an] illegal act.”28  And third, “the acts 
committed by [claimant] during the bidding process [we]re in violation of 
the legal principle that prohibits unlawful enrichment.”29  This principle, 
the Tribunal found, was codified in the “written legal systems of the 
nations governed by the Civil Law system,” and provides that “when the 
cause of the increase in the assets of a certain person is illegal, such 
enrichment must be sanctioned by preventing its consummation.”30  
Accordingly, “the systematic interpretation” of El Salvadorian law, 
underpinned by “the general principles of law,” must deny Claimant the 
right to access the jurisdiction of the Tribunal – irrespective of what the El 
Salvadorian Supreme Court may have already said on the matter.31 
In 1953, Professor Bin Cheng wrote the seminal book on the type of 
“general principles” invoked in these investor-state arbitrations.  Cheng set 
forth five general categories of substantive concepts that are commonly 
recognized by civilized nations.  Basic notions like pacta sunt servanda 
and res judicata are among the most commonly recognized principles, 
expressed as Latin maxims to demonstrate their permanence and 
universality.  Testifying to the importance of these principles of universal 
law, Professor Bin Cheng’s 60 year-old book remains one of the most cited 
treatises by international tribunals. 
But is this a unique phenomenon of investment law?  As a source of 
law listed in the ICJ Statute, is it limited to public international law?  To be 
sure, lawyers not dedicated to non-state mechanisms like international 
arbitration tend to cling to what they know; they tend to fight with the 
national law with which they are familiar, and only begrudgingly accept 
foreign law as a rule of decision.  In the U.S. at least, “the tendency of the 
federal courts is to duck and run when presented with issues of foreign 
 
 27.  Id. ¶ 231. 
 28.  Id. ¶ 242. 
 29.  Id. ¶ 253. 
 30.  Id. ¶ 254. 
 31.  Id. ¶¶ 218, 263. 
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law,”32 and they may run faster when that foreign law is an amalgam of 
ancient principles divined from a comparative exercise.  But the perception 
may not approximate historical reality: national courts may be looking – or 
perhaps should be looking – in the direction of these fundamental 
transnational rules. 
The notion of “general principles” as a formal source of law before the 
International Court of Justice came about when European national courts 
were still reeling with post-WWII trauma.  The Continental European 
tradition of mechanically applying written laws with extreme formalism 
was blamed for the grave injustices perpetuated by the courts of Nazi 
Germany and Vichy France.33  When the war ended, the general principles 
– or principes generaux – obtained favor in France as a reaction against the 
Vichy period, in which French wartime courts blithely applied Vichy 
enactments, offering an alternative source to effectuate justice where the 
written law fails.34 
If the general principles obtained some acceptance in Europe – despite 
the generalized distaste in civil law for anything outside the Code – they 
obtained even greater acceptance in the common law systems.35  In 1960, 
the Government of the Republic of Cuba established Banco Para el 
Comercio Exterior de Cuba (“Bancec”) to serve as an official autonomous 
credit institution for foreign trade.  That same year, all of Citibank’s assets 
in Cuba were seized and nationalized by the Cuban Government.  
Separately, but soon thereafter, Bancec acquired a letter of credit issued by 
Citibank arising from a sugar transaction with a Canadian company.  But 
when Bancec brought suit on the letter of credit in the United States, 
Citibank counter-claimed, asserting a right to set off the value of its seized 
Cuban assets.  Citibank could only do so, though, if Bancec was deemed 
the alter ego of the Government of Cuba, and thus responsible for the 
expropriation.  Cuban law was the natural choice of law, and Cuban law 
 
 32.  Roger J. Miner, The Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S. Federal Courts, 432 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 581, 581 (1995). 
 33.  Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period in France 
and Germany of Judicial Methodology’s Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 101, 103, 
142-48 (2001-2002) (citing, inter alia, JACQUES GHESTIN & GILLES GOUBEAUX, TRAITE DE DROIT 
CIVIL: INTRODUCTION GENERALE (1977)). 
 34.  Id. at 142, 147. 
 35.  This, of course, happens most often where the statute directs the court to “international law” 
as the rule of decision—as in the case of the Alien Tort Statute.  See, e.g., Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, dissenting) (arguing for the application of a 
“principle which is found to be generally accepted by civilized legal systems”); see generally David W. 
Rivkin, A Survey of Transnational Legal Principles in U.S. Courts, 5 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 
231, 234-37 (2011). 
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maintained strict separation between the company and the State, thus 
immunizing Bancec. 
The case wound its way through the federal courts; the district court 
sided with Citibank on finding Bancec sufficiently aligned with the 
Government of Cuba, but the Second Circuit – applying Cuban law – 
reversed.  The case ultimately came to be heard before the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which, in an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
disclaimed blind adherence to Cuban law, or even U.S. law, and instead 
applied “principles of equity common to international law and federal 
common law.”36  These “controlling principles,” it said, were divined in 
large part by U.S. federal common law, supplemented by principles 
adopted by “governments throughout the world.”  These principles formed 
the rule of decision on whether Bancec should be accorded separate legal 
status from the Government of Cuba. 
Citing studies of English law,37 Soviet law,38 and comparative studies 
by both scholars and NGOs39 — while discarding some principles applied 
by foreign courts as “not . . . universally acceptable,”40 — the Court held 
that “[s]eparate legal personality” and “[l]imited liability is the rule, not the 
exception.”41  However, after referring to various authorities on European 
civil law42 and international decisions collecting “the wealth of practice 
already accumulated on the subject in municipal law[s]” around the 
world,43 the Court held that Bancec’s independent corporate status could be 
disregarded in this instance, and that it could be held to answer in a U.S. 
court for Citibank’s expropriation in Cuba.  Ultimately, this result was “the 
product of the application of internationally recognized equitable principles 
to avoid the injustice that would result from permitting a foreign state to 
reap the benefits of our courts while avoiding the obligations of 
international law.” 
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE REGULATION OF 
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE RELATIONSHIPS 
What Justice O’Connor did in Bancec is not completely novel, 
 
 36.  First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S. 611, 
613 (1983). 
 37.  Id. at 624 n.13; see also id. at 625 n.16, 626 n.18. 
 38.  Id. at 624 n.13 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 626 n.18. 
 41.  Id. at 626. 
 42.  Id. at 628 n.20. 
 43.   Id. 
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whether in the United States or abroad.  In that case, the foreign 
instrumentality’s primary argument was that the law of the place of its 
incorporation – there, Cuba – should govern the substantive questions 
relating to its structure and internal affairs.44  To be sure, “[a]s a general 
matter,” the incorporating state’s law typically governs to achieve 
“certainty and predictability” for “parties with interests in the 
corporation.”45  But that rule is not absolute.  According to the Court, “[t]o 
give conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in determining 
whether the separate juridical status of its instrumentality should be 
respected would permit th[at] state to violate with impunity the rights of 
third parties under international law while effectively insulating itself from 
liability in foreign courts.  We decline to permit such a result.”  Nemo iudex 
in causa sua.46  In the place of Cuban law, the Court applied “principles . . . 
common to both international law and federal common law,” as explicated 
by “governments throughout the world.”47  In other words, the Court 
applied those aspects of U.S. common law consonant with “general 
principles recognized by civilized nations.” 
That phrase was inserted into article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice as one of the five sources of international 
law.  It encompasses the positive, private laws of all national judicial 
systems, distilled to their base norms by a deductive and then comparative 
analysis.48  Among the examples of the general principles cited in the 
travaux preparatoires of the ICJ Statute are res judicata, good faith, certain 
points of procedure (like burden of proof), proscription of abuse of rights, 
and lex specialis generalibus derogat.49  These principles are, in a way, 
state practice in foro domestic, and states are bound to them in the same 
way they are bound to customary international law that stems from the 
concordance of their practice on the international plane.50  As stated by one 
U.S. judge, “[p]rivate [domestic] law, being in general more developed 
 
 44.  Id. at 621. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See Cheng, supra note 12, at 279 (“No one can be judge in his own cause.”). 
 47.  First Nat’l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 623-24. 
 48.  See generally Michael D. Nolan & Frederic G. Sourgens, Issues of Proof of General 
Principles of Law, 3 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 505 (2009). 
 49.  Cheng, supra note 12, at 25-26. 
 50.  See Olufemi Elias & Chin Lin, General Principles of Law, Soft Law and the Identification of 
International Law, 28 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 25-26 (1997).  Indeed, the division between custom and 
general principles of law is often not very clear.  In its broadest sense, customary international law may 
include all that is unwritten in international law, but in Article 38(a)(1), custom is strictly confined to 
what is a general practice among States and accepted by them as law.  For the general principles, there 
is the element of recognition on the part of civilized peoples but the requirement of a general practice 
among States is absent.  What is important for Article 38(a)(3) is general practices within States. 
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than international law, has always constituted a sort of reserve store of 
principles upon which the latter has been in the habit of drawing . . . for the 
good reason that a principle which is found to be generally accepted by 
civilized legal systems may fairly be assumed to be so reasonable as to be 
necessary to the maintenance of justice under any system.”51  So 
international tribunals, or national courts faced with a transnational case, 
have this reserve store of principles that form an international minimum 
standard of due process and fairness – based not on their own parochial 
views, but on the universal views of all legal systems. 
There are also examples of this practice outside the United States.  
During the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, ten commercial airplanes 
belonging to Kuwait Airlines were seized by Iraq.  After the First Gulf 
War, Kuwait Airways subsequently brought an action in the UK against 
Iraq Airways for the aircrafts’ return.  In transnational cases like this, 
English courts typically apply the “double actionability rule,” which 
requires that the act be tortious in England and civilly actionable in Iraq 
before an action will lie.52  But, under a special provision of Iraqi law, 
those seized aircraft were legally transferred to Iraqi Airways after the war.  
The Plaintiff conceded this legal point, but argued that the English Court 
should “altogether disregard” that Iraqi law. 
The “normal position,” according to the court, was to follow its 
precedent on choice of law and apply “the laws of another country even 
though those laws are different from the law of the forum court.”53  And, 
while the confiscatory Iraqi law was likely a violation of public 
international law, “breach of international law by a state is not, and should 
not be, a ground for refusing to recognise a foreign decree.”54  While this 
latter principle “is not discretionary,”55 the ultimate choice of law is, and 
“blind adherence to foreign law can never be required of an English court.”  
In exceptional cases, “a provision of foreign law will be disregarded when 
it would lead to a result wholly alien to fundamental requirements of 
justice . . . [That is,] when it would violate some fundamental principle of 
justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted 
tradition of the common weal.”56  In that situation, “the court will decline 
 
 51.  Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, dissenting) 
(quoting J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 62-63 (6th ed. 1963)). 
 52.  Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co., [2002] UKHL 19, ¶ 12, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd020516/kuwait-1.htm. 
 53.  Id. ¶¶ 15-16. 
 54.  Id. ¶ 24. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. ¶¶ 16-17. 
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to enforce or recognise the foreign decree to whatever extent is required in 
the circumstances”57– even though it will continue to apply that foreign law 
as a whole. 
That was the result in the case of Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi 
Airways.  The Iraqi decree transferring legal title of foreign seized property 
no doubt violated international law: “Having forcibly invaded Kuwait, 
seized its assets, and taken KAC’s aircraft from Kuwait to its own territory, 
Iraq adopted this decree as part of its attempt to extinguish every vestige of 
Kuwait’s existence as a separate state.”58  The decree was then plead by 
Iraqi Airways as an impediment to Plaintiff’s claim under the “double 
actionability rule.”  But according to the English Court, “[an] expropriatory 
decree made in these circumstances and for this purpose is simply not 
acceptable today, . . . [and constitutes] a gross violation of established rules 
of international law of fundamental importance.”59 Implicit in the decision 
is the principle of nullus commodum capere de sua injuria propria (no one 
can be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong).  The foreign decree 
that would have otherwise governed the case was excised from Iraqi law 
and entirely ignored.  Because the torts of conversion and usurpation were 
recognized in England and Iraq, respectively, and amply proven by 
Plaintiffs, under both English and Iraqi law the Plaintiff’s claim was 
sustained.60 
General principles of law often form an essential and functioning part 
of the civil law as well.  To fill lacunae, many Civil Codes requires judges 
 
 57.  Id. ¶ 17. 
 58.  Id. ¶ 28. 
 59.  Id. ¶ 29. 
 60.  This is not to suggest that the general principles should abrogate the longstanding adherence 
to the “act of state” doctrine.  In the United States, for instance, the act of state doctrine requires courts 
to presume valid acts of a foreign sovereign taken within its territory, and to refuse to adjudicate cases 
that require the court to assess their validity within that territory.  See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. 
Envt’l Tectonics Corp. 493 U.S. 400, 407 (1990) (“a seizure by a state cannot be complained of 
elsewhere in the sense of being sought to be declared ineffective elsewhere.”).  The Kuwait Airways 
case, however, is different because the English court was not purporting to declare the seizure 
ineffective inside Iraq; it just refused to apply the expropriatory law as the rule of decision in its courts 
(that is, outside of Iraq).  This is something that U.S. courts also can—and must—do.  See, e.g., Maltina 
Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1972) (“our courts will not give 
‘extraterritorial effect’ to a confiscatory decree of a foreign state, even where directed against its own 
nationals.”).  Whether the foreign law will be ignored in this instance is typically a function of local 
“public policy.”  See id. at 78 (“We hold that it is our duty to assess, as a matter of federal law, the 
compatibility with the laws and policy of this country of depriving the original owners of [their] 
property without compensating them for it.” (emphasis added)).  This article posits in § IV, infra, that 
perhaps the amalgam of fundamental legal principles adopted by civilized countries is a more just 
benchmark than the “unruly horse” of local public policy.  Richardson v. Mellish (1824), 2 Bing 229, 
252 (Burrough, J.) (“Public policy is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never 
know where it will carry you”). 
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to reference “the general principles of universal law”,61 and many Codes of 
Civil Procedure instruct courts to decide legal issues “with clarity, based on 
the law and the merits of the process and, in the absence of law, [on] the 
principles of universal justice.”62  But while provisions like these are not 
exceptional in the civil law, their use is.  With a tradition steeped in 
positivism and formalism, there is a concern that judges will employ 
general principles to impose their own unpredictable legal norms, rather 
than following the norms imposed by the legislature – what the French 
might condemn as a “gouvernement de juges.”63  But some civil law 
scholars, heeding the lessons from the pre-WWII era, are beginning to 
eschew this cramped viewpoint of the civil law for something much more 
flexible.64  Indeed, at least some national civil codes expressly direct judges 
to decide cases according to the spirit of their nation’s laws – a spirit 
conveyed by the entirety of the Code.65 
III. INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS AS A MINIMUM 
CORRECTIVE STANDARD 
The “general principles of law” are not a tool of oppression; they are 
not just a way to correct idiosyncratic and exotic laws.  Their procedural 
element, in fact, works just the opposite effect. 
Arriving at one definition of substantive justice in a transnational case 
is a difficult thing.  Every state has vastly different procedures to determine 
what is “justice,” and those procedures produce vastly different final 
judgments.  But when recognition of those judgments is sought abroad, the 
enforcement  state must ascertain whether they meet minimum standards of 
justice before giving them its imprimatur.   Like the discretionary 
application of foreign law, “[n]ations are not inexorably bound to enforce 
judgments obtained in each other’s courts.”  In the United States, as in 
many national courts, “[i]t has long been the law . . . that a foreign 
judgment cannot be enforced if it was obtained in a manner that did not 
accord with the basics of due process.”66  Similarly, if an individual 
 
 61.  Civil Code, art. 18 (Ecuador); see also Code of Civil Procedure, art. 8 (Venez.); Code of 
Criminal Procedure, art. 134 (Arg.); Code of Civil Procedure, art. 274 (Ecuador); Constitución Política 
de la República de Chile [C.P.], art. 54; Constitution, arts. 3, 9, 11 (Arm.); Constitution, art. 24 (Bulg.); 
Code of Civil Procedure, art. 145 (Bol.); Code of Civil Procedure, art. 2 (Kaz.). 
 62.  Code of Civil Procedure, art. 278 (Ecuador). 
 63.  See Curran, supra note 34, at 148. 
 64.  See id. at 144 (citing, inter alia, Jean Boulanger, Principes généreaux du droit et droit positif, 
in 1 LE DROIT FRANCAIS AU MILEAU DU XXE SIÈCLE: ÉTUDES OFFERTES À GEORGES RIPERT 68 (1951)). 
 65.  See Civil Code, art. 1 (Switz.); Civil Code, art. 12 (It.).  This sort of judicial methodology has 
a long history in Germany, too.  See Curran, supra note 34, at 151-66. 
 66.  Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1410, 1412 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).  By 
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aggrieved by a foreign judgment or government decision wants redress for 
his gripe on the international level, he can bring an arbitral claim against 
the offending state under a relevant BIT (if one indeed exists).  That state 
will be liable for a denial of justice if the decision was tainted by a 
“flagrant abuse of judicial procedure”67 or “fundamental breaches of due 
process.”68  In both scenarios, while “[a]n alien usually must take [a 
foreign] legal system as he finds it, with all its deficiencies and 
imperfections,”69 “[t]he sovereign right of a state to do justice cannot be 
perverted into a weapon for circumventing its obligations toward aliens 
who must seek the aid of its courts.”70  In both scenarios, there is an 
international minimum standard of justice that must be done.  And, as we 
will see below, the national and international inquiries largely overlap.  
This is because, for nearly as long as individuals were engaging each other 
across national borders, there has existed a rudimentary code of 
“international due process” consisting of “certain minimum standards in the 
administration of justice of such elementary fairness and general 
application in the legal systems of the world that they have become 
 
design and necessity, the “basics” are not parochial; the standard is not “intended to bar the enforcement 
of all judgments of any foreign legal system that does not conform its procedural doctrines to the latest 
twist and turn of our courts.”  Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).  
Indeed, the statute requires only that the foreign procedure be “compatible with the requirements of due 
process of law,” not ‘equivalent’ to the requirements of American due process, and “[i]t is a fair guess 
that no foreign nation has decided to incorporate [U.S. notions of] due process doctrines into its own 
procedural law.”  Id.  So, while a foreign legal system need not share every jot and tittle of U.S. 
jurisprudence, it “must abide by fundamental standards of procedural fairness,” Cunard Steamship Co. 
v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1985), and “afford the defendant the basic tenets 
of due process,” Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997)—that is, “a concept of fair 
procedure simple and basic enough to describe the judicial processes of civilized nations, our peers”—if 
it wants its judgments enforced here, Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477.  According to Judge Posner of the 
United States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, “[w]e’ll call this the ‘international concept of 
due process’ to distinguish it from the complex concept that has emerged from [domestic] case law.”  
Id. 
 67.  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 155-56 (Feb. 5) 
(Tanaka, J., concurring). 
 68.  JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (2005). 
 69.  Salem (U.S.) v. Egypt, 2 R.I.A.A. 1161, 1202 (1932).  For instance, in The Affaire du 
Capitaine Thomas Melville White, the British Government complained to an arbitral tribunal that the 
arrest of one of its citizens in Peru was illegal.  The tribunal, however, had  “little doubt” that “the rules 
of procedure to be observed by the courts in [Peru] are to be judged solely and alone according to the 
legislation in force there.”  See Décision de la commission, chargée, par le Sénat de la Ville libre 
hanséatique de Hambourg, de prononcer dans la cause du capitaine Thomas Melville White, datée de 
Hambourg du 13 avril 1864, in Henri La Fontaine, PASICRISIE INTERNATIONALE, 1794-1900: HISTOIRE 
DOCUMENTAIRE DES ARBITRAGES INTERNATIONAUX, 48 (Kluwer 1997) (1902). 
 70.  J. Irizarry y Puente, The Concept of Denial of Justice in Latin America, 43 MICH. L. REV. 383 
(1944). 
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international legal standards.”71 
One might think that the mutual interests of international commerce 
and the rule of law would espouse an incredibly high standard of “due 
process” in both scenarios.  It doesn’t.  The cross-border movement of legal 
rights and judgments depends largely upon a “spirit of co-operation” 
among states, which in the end is guided by “many values” beyond 
substantive justice, “among them predictability, . . .  ease of commercial 
interactions, and stability through satisfaction of mutual expectations.”72  
To satisfy these needs, international challenges to judgments and judicial 
recognition of the same do not turn on American, common law, or even 
Western notions of “due process.”  Rather, as we will see below, they turn 
on “a concept of fair procedure simple and basic enough to describe the 
judicial processes of civilized nations.”73  Stated otherwise, in both the 
national and international scenario, the applicable standard of due process 
requires only “justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such general 
acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part of the international 
law of the world.”74 
This notion of international due process is drawn from the general 
principles of law.  But rather than supplanting and correcting-upward a 
deficient foreign law before it is applied in a local court, international due 
process corrects-downward the parochial notions of local due process to 
grant greater leeway to foreign judgments.  Drawing on our prior 
discussion of “Rex,” this deferential standard aims to help his minimally-
adequate decisions and judgments gain international approval (provided, of 
course, that they are minimally adequate); not supplant them with a 
different set of processes, priorities and rules.  In this way, the general 
principles coalesce around this one minimum standard of treatment to 
which all states can, and must, strive to attain. 
For well over a century, U.S. jurisprudence has itself compiled a 
laundry list of elements that undergird the  ‘international concept of due 
process.’  There must be, for instance, an “opportunity for [a] full and fair 
trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction”; “regular 
proceedings” and not ad hoc procedures; “due [notice] or voluntary 
 
 71.  Friedmann, supra note 12, at 290. 
 72.  Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist., 482 U.S. 522, 543 n.27 
(1987). 
 73.  Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 74.  Elihu Root, President, Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing 
Abroad, Address Before the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Apr. 28-30, 
1910), in 4 PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L. 16, 21 (1910), quoted in Edwin Borchard, The “Minimum 
Standard” of the Treatment of Aliens, 38 MICH. L. REV. 445, 458 (1940). 
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appearance of the defendant”; “a system of . . . impartial administration of 
justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other 
countries”; and assurances against “fraud in procuring the judgment.”75  
Other elements include the assurance that “the judiciary was [not] 
dominated by the political branches of government or by an opposing 
litigant”; that the defendant was able to “obtain counsel, to secure 
documents or attendance of witnesses”; and that the parties “have access to 
appeal or review.”76  These “are not mere niceties of American 
jurisprudence” but are instead “the ingredients of ‘civilized jurisprudence’” 
and “basic due process.”77 
These core concepts of international due process can be directly traced 
to the general principles of law.  As a theoretical matter, both are based in 
the positive laws that apply in domestic legal systems.  Just as national 
principles become general principles when they are universally accepted by 
the majority of civilized legal systems, rules of process form the baseline 
notion of international due process when they are “simple and basic enough 
to describe the judicial processes of civilized nations, our peers.”78 
We see this common thread between principles and process as a 
matter of practice, too.  The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that 
judgments rendered without service of process or notice are contrary to 
“immutable principle[s] of natural justice,”79 “coram non judice,”80 and 
void.81  This is not only a general principle of American law, but is also a 
“fundamental condition[]” that is “universally prescribed in all systems of 
law established by civilized countries.”82  Accordingly, this basic principle 
forms a core component of both American due process and international 
due process,83 such that judicial judgments, if they were rendered in their 
 
 75.  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895). 
 76.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b (1987). 
 77.  Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 
205); see also British Midland Airways Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 1974) (“It 
has long been the law that unless a foreign country’s judgments are the result of outrageous departures 
from our own notions of ‘civilized jurisprudence,’ comity should not be refused” (quoting Hilton, 159 
U.S. at 205)). 
 78.  Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477. 
 79.  Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U.S. 466, 475 (1830). 
 80.  Coram non judice means “[o]utside the presence of a judge” or “[b]efore a judge or court that 
is not the proper one or that cannot take legal cognizance of the matter.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
338 (7th ed. 1999). 
 81.  See, e.g., Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. 336, 350-51 (1850). 
 82.  Twining v. New Jersey, 21 U.S. 78, 111 (1908). 
 83.  See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 166 (“Every foreign judgment, of whatever nature, in order to be 
entitled to any effect, must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and upon 
regular proceedings, and due notice.”); Int’l Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana, 
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state of origin without proper notice, will almost universally be denied 
recognition and enforcement in another state and may even constitute an 
international delict if property is seized in the rendering state as a result.84 
Similarly, Professor Bin Cheng devoted a chapter of his book on the 
General Principles to the notion of audiatur et altera pars, which translates 
in practice to the “fundamental requirement of equality between the parties 
in judicial proceedings” and their equal right to be heard.85  Elsewhere, he 
discussed the maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa, or the 
“universally accepted doctrine that no one can be judge in his own 
cause,”86 and the principle that requires tribunals to exercise only that 
jurisdiction authorized by law (extra compromisum arbiter nihil facere 
potest).  All three of these general principles have found their way into the 
core notions of international due process.  Nearly contemporaneously with 
Bin Cheng’s book, the Council of Europe drafted the European Convention 
on Human Rights, which provided an early attempt to codify an intra-
European baseline of due process, and included within it the guarantee that 
“everyone is entitled to [(1)] a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time [(2)] by an independent and impartial tribunal [(3)] established by 
law.”87  Violation of this article can impugn a foreign judgment in both 
domestic88 and international89 courts.  The parallels between Bin Cheng’s 
general principles of law and the ECHR’s baseline notion of due process 
are hard to ignore. 
Modern soft law codifications, like the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure, provide an even clearer example of many of 
the principles underlying international due process.90  For instance, the 
 
SA de CV, 347 F.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Notice is an element of our notion of due process and 
the United States will not enforce a judgment obtained without the bare minimum requirements of 
notice.”). 
 84.  See, e.g., Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award, ¶¶ 146-51 (Apr. 12, 2002), 18 ICSID Rev.–FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
L.J. 602 (2003). 
 85.  CHENG, supra note 12, at 291-98. 
 86.  Id. at 279. 
 87.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. VI, para. 1, 
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (emphasis 
added). 
 88.  See, e.g., Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. v. OAO Rosneft, Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Case No. 
200.005.269/01, Decision, ¶ 3.10 (Apr. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/170/4135.html (unofficial translation). 
 89.  See, e.g., Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, ¶ 551 (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-106308. 
 90.  Instruments like these are, almost by definition, an attempt to deduce general principles from 
a comparative exercise.  They are, according to one scholar, “normative instrument[s] that attempt[] to 
construct a single unified body of . . . rules from a number of legal systems.”  Peter L. Fitzgerald, The 
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three general principles that underlie the notion of a fair hearing by a 
competent court are listed in the first three articles of that instrument, 
which address the “independence [and] impartiality” of judges, their 
“jurisdiction over parties,” and the “procedural equality of the parties.”91  
The general principle that judgments cannot be rendered without due notice 
follows soon thereafter, at article 5.92  That article also catalogues a number 
of general principles that have been applied as such by national and 
international courts, including the requirement of “effective . . . notice” at 
the outset of proceedings, and the “right to submit relevant contentions of 
fact and law and to offer supporting evidence” in support of a defense or a 
claim.93 
Other general principles appear throughout the ALI/UNIDROIT 
Principles, too.  A claimant bears the burden of proof, and a defendant must 
prove all the material facts that are the basis of his defense.94  These are 
universal principles that have long been applied as such by domestic and 
international courts and tribunals.95  There also is “little, if indeed any 
question as to res judicata being a general principle of law” common to all 
civilized countries.96  That a second suit is barred by a former adjudication 
involving the same subject matter and legal bases is “a principle inherent in 
all judicial systems.”97  The Principles, too, are designed to “avoid 
repetitive litigation” with detailed rules on claim and issue preclusion.98  
 
International Contracting Practices Survey Project: An Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the 
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, Jurists, and Legal Academics in the United 
States, 27 J. L. & COMM. 1, 33 (2008); see also Berger, supra note 15, at 109-13. 
 91.  ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, 2004 UNIFORM L. REV, 758, 
760-66. 
 92.  Id. at 768. 
 93.  ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 92, art. 5.4; CHENG, supra note 12, at 293; see, e.g., 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 159 (1895) (To be recognized, a foreign judgment must be the product 
of “due allegations and proofs, and opportunity to defend against them.”); Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco 
Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1992) (refusing recognition of arbitral award under the due process 
defense of the New York Convention, where judge had previously told the claimant that invoices may 
be submitted in summary form to prove their claims, only to switch course at the hearing on the merits 
and deny the claims for failure to submit the original invoices; “by so misleading [claimant], however 
unwittingly, the Tribunal denied [claimant] the opportunity to present its claim in a meaningful 
manner.”); Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, 125 F.3d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997) (“When the exclusion 
of relevant evidence actually deprived a party of a fair hearing, therefore, it is appropriate to vacate an 
arbitral award.”). 
 94.  ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 92, art. 21. 
 95.  See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 12, at 326-335. 
 96.  Id. at 336. 
 97.  PETER R. BARNETT, RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPEL AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: THE PRECLUSIVE 
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUGDMENTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 1.12 (2001). 
 98.  ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 92, art. 28, cmt. P-28A. 
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And, it has been universally acknowledged that a default judgment cannot 
lie until the court has satisfied itself of its jurisdiction and that the claim is 
well-founded in fact and law.99  The Principles, too, incorporate this rule.100 
When pulled together into a “Transnational [Code of] Civil 
Procedure,” as ALI and UNIDROIT have done, these individual principles 
form a set of minimum “standards for adjudication of transnational 
commercial disputes.”101  In other words, they constitute an attempted 
codification of “international due process.” 
The application of the international concept of due process is 
becoming more common in domestic courts, and we can point to some 
high-profile examples.  Several years ago, thousands of Nicaraguan citizens 
sued Dole Food Company and The Dow Chemical Company in Nicaraguan 
courts, alleging that they were exposed to chemicals causing them to be 
infertile while working on the defendants’ banana plantations.  Nicaraguan 
courts applied Special Law 364, which was enacted in Nicaragua 
specifically to handle these claims.102  This law assumed the plaintiffs were 
indigent and covered their costs, imposed minimum damage amounts, 
irrefutable presumptions of causation, summary proceedings, abolition of 
the statute of limitations, and strict curtailment of appellate review.103  In 
the end, Nicaraguan courts entered over $2 billion in judgments for the 
plaintiffs. 
When Plaintiffs sought to enforce one of these judgments in Florida, 
the defendants objected on numerous grounds, including the lack of due 
process that the defendants received in Nicaragua.  The court, citing 
Ashenden, evaluated the Special Law 364 to determine whether it was 
“‘fundamentally fair.’”104  Because it “targets a handful of United States 
companies for burdensome and unfair treatment to which domestic 
Nicaraguan defendants are never subjected,” the court held that the foreign 
judgment should not be recognized or enforced.  Specifically: 
 
[T]he legal regime set up by Special Law 364 and applied in this case 
does not comport with the “basic fairness” that the “international concept 
of due process” requires.  It does not even come close.  “Civilized 
nations” do not typically require defendants to pay out millions of 
dollars without proof that they are responsible for the alleged injuries.  
 
 99.  See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 12, at 297. 
 100.  ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 92, art. 15.3. 
 101.  Id. at 758. 
 102.  Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1316-18 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
 103.  Id. [BB 4.1][subs ok, as noted above, changed pincite][EK] 
 104.  Id. at 1327 (citing Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
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Basic fairness requires proof of a connection between a plaintiff’s injury 
and a defendant’s conduct (i.e., causation) before awarding millions of 
dollars in damages.  Civilized nations do not target and discriminate 
against a handful of foreign companies and subject them to minimum 
damages so dramatically out of proportion with damage awards against 
resident defendants.  In summary, civilized nations simply do not subject 
foreign defendants to the type of discriminatory laws and procedures 
mandated by Special Law 364, and the Court cannot enforce the 
judgment because it was rendered under a legal system that did not 
provide “procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of 
law.”105 
 
This admonishment from the court in Osorio didn’t flow from the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, whose “due process” 
clause encompasses not only “idiosyncratic jurisprudence”106 on principles 
of procedural fairness, but also substantive matters like personal privacy107 
and applicable law.108  “It is a fair guess that no foreign nation has decided 
to incorporate our due process doctrines into its own procedural law,”109 so 
insisting on all of the rigors of our system would undoubtedly stunt the 
movement of judgments abroad.  The deficient process followed in 
Nicaragua violated something far less stringent and more fundamental – 
that is, the basic rules of procedural fairness followed by all “[c]ivilized 
nations.”110 
International norms developed through “discursive synthesis” like this 
– that is, the interaction of many different legal traditions and principles – 
are always “more likely to be implemented [in national legal systems] and 
less likely to be disobeyed [on the international level].”111  In some ways, 
this is Harold Koh’s “Transnational Legal Process” on full display – 
principles are divined from the interaction of legal systems, those principles 
are internalized into a country’s normative system, and a new baseline legal 
rule is created which will guide transnational interactions between parties 
in the future.112  The result, we can hope, is a compliance pull to the rule of 
law, and the optimistic establishment of “enclaves of justice.”  In Mexico, 
 
 105.  Id. at 1345. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 106.  Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477. 
 107.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (noting the private nature of the 
petitioners’ conduct). 
 108.  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
 109.  Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476. 
 110.  Id. at 477. 
 111.  THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 481 (1995). 
 112.  Harold Koh, The Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 204-05 (1996); Harold 
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2646 (1997). 
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for instance, it is reported that NAFTA has encouraged government 
officials and courts to avoid conduct that might fall below the international 
minimum standard, and thereby be impugned in an international forum.113  
A foreign court applying a baseline notion of international due process to 
Mexican laws and decisions might exert a similar compliance pull – to the 
benefit of foreigners and citizens alike. 
Of course, commentators may levy the same criticisms against this 
process that have been made since the inception of “general principles” as a 
primary source of international law nearly a century ago.  Some may 
bemoan that “unelected” judges may be given free rein to divine principles 
made by “the world community at the expense of state prerogatives,” 
where “the interests of the [home] state[] are neither formally nor 
effectively represented in th[at] lawmaking process.”114  But, in a 
transnational case, there is nothing new about judges applying law that was 
made elsewhere; it happens all the time whenever the courts’ own choice-
of-law principles so direct.  Nor is there anything undemocratic about 
judges applying principles that were crystallized outside its territorial 
jurisdiction (at least in non-Constitutional matters).115  This is something 
that American judges have done since the beginning of the Republic, 
whenever they declared rules of customary international law to be part of 
“general common law.”116  The process of “finding”117 general principles – 
that is, identifying the underlying legal rationale behind a particular rule 
and surveying its general acceptance across legal systems – is certainly no 
more (and probably less) discretionary than divining a customary 
international law.118  And if predictable outcomes is the main concern, and 
 
 113.  See Paulsson, supra note 2. 
 114.  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 868 (1997). 
 115.  I am not suggesting that these general principles can or should be applied to help discern a 
constitutional question.  See generally Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653 (2009).  That lively debate of beyond 
the scope of this article.  I will only note that it is a far lesser intrusion—and far less controversial—to 
apply these principles to a transnational civil case, where the parties have litigated their claims overseas 
or are actually arguing for the applicability of foreign law. 
 116.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Hinderlider v. La Plata 
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (U.S. courts variably “apply Federal law, 
state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand.”); The Nereide, 
13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815) (stating that “the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the 
law of the land”). 
 117.  See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 
1561-62 (1984) (“In a real sense federal courts find international law rather than make it, . . . as is 
clearly not the case when federal judges make federal common law pursuant to constitutional or 
legislative delegation.”). 
 118.  Harold Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1853 (1998). 
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judges cannot be trusted to ensure that predictability, is not a methodology 
designed to apply well-accepted and ancient principles better than that 
hazards of an uncertain choice of law determination, followed by blind 
adherence to idiosyncratic rules?119 
 
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO THE MODERN 
ROLE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The discipline of private international law, defined in its simplest 
terms, is the body of authority that regulates private relationships across 
national borders, and resolves questions that result from the presence of 
foreign elements in legal relationships.120  This doesn’t tell us much, so we 
need to dig a bit deeper. 
Contrary to what the label suggests, it is also important to 
acknowledge that private international law is really not “international law” 
at all, in that it does not constitute a set of rights and obligations between 
states.  Rather, it is municipal law that is applied because of the presence of 
a foreign element.  By ASIL’s definition it “has a dualistic character, 
balancing international consensus with domestic recognition and 
implementation, as well as balancing sovereign actions with those of the 
private sector.”121 
Traditionally, “private international law” does its part to resolve 
transnational disputes by pointing parties to the proper forum and the 
proper law, without purporting to resolve the substance of a juridical 
question.  Its rules rarely provide the ultimate solution to a dispute, and it 
has been said that this discipline of law “resembles the inquiry office at a 
railway station where a passenger may learn the platform at which his train 
 
 119.  See Emmanuel Galliard, General Principles of Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration—Challenging the Myths, 5 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 161, 169 (2011). 
 120.  See, e.g., P.M. North & J.J. Fawcett, CHESHIRE & NORTH’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 
7 (13th ed. 1999); Private International Law, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,  
http://www.oas.org/dil/private_international_law.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) (“Private International 
Law is the legal framework composed of conventions, protocols, model laws, legal guides, uniform 
documents, case law, practice and custom, as well as other documents and instruments, which regulate 
relationships between individuals in an international context.”); Private International Law, 
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Internationalrelations/PrivateInternationalLaw/Pages/default.aspx) (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2013) (“Private international law is an area of law that deals with civil transactions and disputes 
that contain international elements. Also known as ‘conflicts of laws’, the subject is primarily 
concerned with developing principles and rules to resolve the following three stages of a legal conflict: 
Jurisdiction, Choice of law, Recognition and enforcement of judgments.”). 
 121.  Louise Tsang, Private International Law, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (June 
21, 2011), http://www.asil.org/erg/?page=pil. 
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starts”—it points parties to the right court and the right law, “[b]ut it says 
no more.”122  If this sounds like a simple process, leading to clean and 
predictable results, it isn’t.  One negative consequence of the inherently 
municipal nature of private international law is uncertainty: with little 
harmonization of these various rules among states, there is no guarantee 
that the same dispute involving a foreign element will be decided in the 
same manner from one jurisdiction to another.  And even once a choice of 
forum and law is made, the chosen law doesn’t always dictate a simple, 
judicious, and expected result.  The chosen local law applied to the 
transnational case can lead to absurd results, and foreign law applied in 
local courts can often be even worse. 
As the discussion above demonstrates, in order to play a meaningful 
role in aiding the resolution of modern transnational disputes, the 
authorities that encompass the rules of private international law must play a 
role in determining the substance of those municipal laws applied to the 
transnational scenario.  Like investment tribunals in the past decade-and-a-
half, courts seised with transnational matters and asked to apply foreign 
law should develop corrective mechanisms grounded in positive law that 
ensure substantive justice from a universal perspective.  If we continue to 
hew to a mechanical application of the chosen municipal law, and excuse it 
with “meretricious concessions to cultural relativism,” we may find 
ourselves “complicit with dictators, fanatics and thugs” who have 
perpetrated the “fraudulent consensus on the rule of law” worldwide.123  By 
the same token, if we continue to rely on the “unruly horse” of local public 
policy, or insist on parochial norms to stunt the movement of foreign 
judgments around the world, we threaten the very foundation of 
international law—that “systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and 
goodwill” which furthers the “mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly 
functioning international legal reg ime.”124 
To some extent, private international law organizations have already 
heeded this call.  The Hague Conference on Private International Law, for 
one, has recently acknowledged the “need, in practice, to facilitate access 
to foreign law” as an “essential component to . . . the rule of law and  . . . 
the proper administration of justice.”125  Efforts like this will make it easier 
 
 122.  See North & Fawcett, supra note 121, at 8-9. 
 123.  See Paulsson, supra note 2, at 9. 
 124.  Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 
522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 125.  See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law, Feb. 15-17, 2012, Conclusions 
and Recommendations on Access to Foreign Law in Civil and Commercial Matters, available at 
http://www.oas.org/dil/private_international_law.htm. 
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for the national judge to apply the whole law to a particular case – the 
underlying universal principles as well as its normative code.126  Moving 
one step further, for almost a century the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) has been modernizing, 
harmonizing, and coordinating the rules of private commercial law to 
formulate uniform law instruments, and numerous treaties have been 
concluded between states that effectively do the same.127  And for centuries 
before that, lex mercatoria has provided rules of international trade that 
have long been used to “clarify, to fill gaps, and to reduce the impact of 
peculiarities of individual country’s laws.”128  But insofar as they are 
derived from scholarly consensus (in the case of uniform law instruments), 
and mercantile usage (in the case of lex mercatoria), these non-state laws 
have their obvious drawbacks.129  Municipal courts may not recognize the 
choice of non-state codifications to a particular dispute before it.  In 
Europe, this traces back to Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention, which 
stipulates that the Convention governs the “choice between the laws of 
different countries.”130  Other provisions, too, especially those dealing with 
contracts – such as Articles 3 (3) and 7 (1) – refer to the applicable law as 
“the law of a country.”  This is true in the United States too.  Section 187 of 
the Second Restatement of Conflicts, and Sections 1-105 and 1-301 of the 
UCC, designate the law to which reference is made as the “law of a state.” 
And because “state” is defined in that Restatement as a “territorial unit with 
a distinct body of law,” this wording suggests that only the application – 
and the choice – of state law is contemplated.131  There is a need, then, for 
 
 126.  See infra note 146. 
 127.  See, e.g., Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11; Protocol to 
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air 
Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371; 
Convention, Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other than the Contracting Carrier, Sept. 18, 1961, 
500 U.N.T.S. 31. 
 128.  Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s View, in LEX MERCATORIA AND 
ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW 71 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1998). 
 129.  See Galliard, supra note 120, at 161-62 (noting that “it would be misleading . . . to equate 
general principles with lex mercatoria” because only the former is “rooted in national legal systems” 
and identified through a comparative law analysis). 
 130.  Convention 80/934/ECC on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature 
in Rome on June 19, 1980. 
 131.  Case law is generally in accord.  In Trans Meridian Trading Inc. v. Empresa Nacional de 
Comercializacion de Insumos, 829 F.2d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1987), for example, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin payment on an international letter of credit despite the fact that 
the contract had been expressly made subject to the “Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary 
Credit (UCP)” published by the International Chamber of Commerce, which allowed issuance of an 
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an established source of positive law to do what the lex mercatoria does – 
to “clarify, to fill gaps, and to reduce the impact of peculiarities of 
individual country’s laws.”132 
This is precisely where the “general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations” can, and should, enter the field of private international 
law.  These principles are, by definition, borne from municipal law – or in 
the least the distillation of underlying legal principles that give shape to 
those positive laws.  Again, by definition, they stem from “international 
consensus” – before being characterized as general, the judge must deem 
them accepted by the majority of legal systems in the world.  And they 
must also possess some modicum of “domestic recognition” to be accepted 
by the forum that seeks to apply them.  In the transnational case, involving 
litigants from varying legal traditions, a solution premised on international 
rather than municipal principles is always the preferred solution; a solution 
based on one of the three primary “sources of international law” codified 
by the Statute of the International Court of Justice may be the best solution 
of all.  One could even argue that this source of international law is the one 
that is best designed for private international law cases; it is, after all, the 
only source that derives from the world’s many municipal codes, which in 
and of themselves are designed to apply to the conduct of private 
relationships. 
To be clear, though, this suggestion is not intended to formulate a new 
approach to the choice of law, even though on its face it may look like the 
“better law” approach championed by Professor Leflar a half-century 
ago,133 or the “principles of preference” introduced by Professor Cavers 
decades before that.134  Both sought to announce criteria of rule-selection; a 
“choice between laws;”135 a unified theory by which judges could choose 
the competing municipal law that would best effect “relevant multistate 
policies”136 or some subjective notion of justice.137  What I am suggesting 
 
injunction under the given circumstances. The court held that the UCP was not the law “of a foreign 
jurisdiction, but rather . . . a compendium of commercial practices published by the International 
Chamber of Commerce.”  Therefore, “a provision in a letter of credit that the UCP governs the 
transaction” did not “prevent application of California’s Commercial Code.” 
 132.  Lowenfeld, supra note 129, at 149. 
 133.  R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 258 (1968). 
 134.  D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 64 (1965). 
 135.  LEFLAR, supra note 134, at 258. 
 136.  CAVERS, supra note 135, at 64. 
 137.  I would note, however, that there is no reason why the general principles of law could not 
play an important role in the search for the appropriate choice of law.  For example, in Eli Lilly do 
Brasil, Ltda v. Fed. Express Co., 502 F.3d 78, 81-82 (2d Cir. 2007), Eli Lilly had contracted with 
FedEx to ship pharmaceuticals, which were stolen while being transported by truck in Brazil.  Eli Lilly 
elected to sue in the Southern District of New York instead of Brazil, requiring the court to determine 
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comes after a choice of law is made.  From there the court ascertains that 
law – and, if necessary, invokes certain “general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations” to correct any unjust outcomes perpetuated 
by that law.  From there that law is applied in this corrected form, 
hopefully resulting in “justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such 
general acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part of the 
international law of the world.”138  At the very least, it results in a chosen 
law that eschews parochial outcomes for a transnational dispute.  That is 
the law that sets sail beyond a state’s borders. 
Nor is this an effort to craft a comparative code of conduct applicable 
to transnational relationships everywhere.  It is much more modest than 
that.  These principles are distinguishable from rules.  “A rule . . . is 
essentially practical and, moreover, binding.”139  The Eighth 
Commandment, ‘Thou Shalt Not Steal,’ is a fundamental rule, adopted by 
every civilized legal system, but its widespread acceptance does not make 
it a “general principle of law recognized by civilized nations.”140  Principles 
simply “express[] a general truth, which guides our action,” and the action 
of legislatures, and “serves as a theoretical basis” for binding rules of 
practical application.141  By way of illustration, while theft may be strictly 
prohibited as a firm rule, the principle that laws have only prospective 
effect142 (for instance) is far less obligatory. 
So when a municipal court is given the authority to apply a certain law 
 
whether the federal common law or Brazilian law applied.  In conducting its choice of law analysis, the 
court recognized that Brazil’s interest under § 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was 
greater than the United States’ interest; however, the court noted that this was not the “end of [the] 
inquiry or determinative of its conclusion.”  The court found that the expectation of enforceability of 
contracts should be afforded greater weight than Brazilian law.  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
applied the following two general principles of law: (1) “the well-settled ‘presumption in favor of 
applying that law tending toward the validation of the alleged contract’” and (2) “the general rule of 
contract that ‘presumes the legality and enforceability of contracts’”—pacta sunt servanda.  Id. at 82; 
see also CHENG, supra note 12, at 142.  Since these general principles favored enforcing the contract, 
they were weighed against Brazil’s interest in having its own law applied.  The principle of locus regit 
actum—and the greater interest in applying the law of another interested sovereign—was displaced by 
the general principle of law that the contract may rather have effect than be nullified. Ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat. 
 138.  Root, supra note 75, at 21. 
 139.  CHENG, supra note 12, at 376. 
 140.  See Filartiga v. Pena–Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he mere fact that every 
nation’s municipal law may prohibit theft does not incorporate the Eighth Commandment, ‘Thou shalt 
not steal’ [into] the law of nations.”); see also Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 249 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (“Even if certain conduct is universally proscribed by States in their domestic law, that fact is 
not necessarily significant or relevant for purposes of customary international law.”). 
 141.  CHENG, supra note 12, at 376. 
 142.  CHENG, supra note 12, at 141. 
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to a transnational case – be it foreign or domestic – its authority is plenary, 
and it has the authority to determine foreign law before it applies it.  This is 
vital, and it means that the whole law, including the superior norms and 
foundational principles to the black-letter rules, may be applied.143  A 
foreign criminal law that purports to have retroactive effect may be rejected 
by the municipal court seised to apply it, for instance, on the grounds that 
such laws violate the “general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations” (including, very likely, the nation whose legislature purported to 
ignore it).  By the same token, a domestic law which requires witnesses to 
stand on their head as they testify should not foreclose the enforcement of a 
foreign judgment where the trial witnesses stand on their feet; the 
international standard of due process demands no more.144  Whatever the 
fate of those “unprincipled” rules in the territories of the states that enacted 
them, they remain there.  The application of the general principles keep the 
law145 in good health, even though imperfect “laws” may be passed from 
time to time. 
 
 143.  See, e.g., Paulsson,  supra note 2, at 12-13 (describing the multiple levels of rules that apply 
to sports). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 is broad enough to encompass a deep study of systemic 
norms when asked to discern and apply a foreign law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (“In determining foreign 
law, the court may consider any relevant material or source” (emphasis added). Indeed, as Judge Posner 
has recently noted, judges are “experts on law,” and thus may resort to the “abundance of published 
materials, in the form of treatises, law review articles, statutes, and cases, . . . to provide neutral 
illumination of issues of foreign law.” See Bodum, USA, Inc. v. La Cafeitere, Inc., 621 F.3D 624, 633 
(7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., concurring). While interested foreign sovereigns often come into U.S. court, 
as amicus or otherwise, to espouse a particular interpretation, U.S. courts typically do not give these 
proffered interpretations determinative weight without due consideration and assessment of their 
correctness within the broader regime of the particular foreign law.  See, e.g., Access Telecom, Inc. v. 
MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 714 (5th Cir. 1999) (“we do not feel compelled to credit the 
[foreign agency’s] determinations without analysis”); McNab v. United States, 331 F.3d 1228, 1241-45 
(11th Cir. 2003) (refusing to defer to the Honduran government’s interpretation of its own law because 
that interpretation conflicted with the text of three other Honduran statutes). This is the correct 
approach, especially when the proffering sovereign has a financial stake in the outcome of the case.  But 
see Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d 70, 92 
(2002) (A foreign sovereign’s views regarding its own laws merit—although they do not command—
”some degree of deference.”); In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1312 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(the court owes “substantial deference to the construction a foreign sovereign places upon its domestic 
law, because [it has] long recognized the demands of comity in suits involving foreign states, either as 
parties, or as sovereigns with a coordinate interest in the litigation”). 
 144.  See, e.g., PAULSSON, supra note 69, at 205. 
 145.  I use the italicized word “the law” in this sense to mean the national law in its totality.  
“Laws,” on the other hand, are singular edits, decrees, and the like. Paulsson, supra note 4, at 215.  It is 
a flaw of the English language that there are not two words to make the distinction.  In French, for 
instance, when the legislature passes “le lois,” it never dispenses with “le droit.”  Replacing the latter 
would take a revolution.  We are thus speaking here of the equivalent of France’s “le droit”—the 
system of legal norms that are the object and instrument of legal order in a society, and which create, 
modify, apply and impose respect for that order.  Id. at 217 (citing S. ROMANO, L’ORDINAMENTO 
GUIRIDICO 10 (1918)). 
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Owing to their “inchoate” nature and corrective role, such principles 
actually do better resting alongside the black letter rules of municipal law, 
guiding the application of municipal law rather than forming a freestanding 
rule of decision themselves.  For international law writ large, this is 
common territory.  In many contexts, only once challenges are raised to the 
legitimacy or propriety of municipal law is the “[a]ttention . . . immediately 
switched to international law, to see whether it may have a corrective 
effect, by operation of such things as international minimum standards or 
international public policy.”146  This is the norm before investment 
tribunals, where the “general principles of law” are very often applied in a 
corrective role.  This apparent modesty, however, should not be overstated.  
As we have seen above, general principles of law can correct a rule of law 
in an outcome determinative way, even in municipal courts.  When an 
otherwise applicable foreign law would shield a state-owned corporation 
from liability, and allow it to benefit from its own state’s international 
delicts, “general principles” step in to disregard the corporation’s separate 
legal status.147  “[L]imited liability is [still] the rule,” but “controlling 
principles” imply an exception.148  Similarly, even when parochial notions 
of due process might render a foreign judgment unenforceable, a “less 
demanding standard” of “international due process” – derived from certain 
principles and processes accepted by civilized nations – may be applied to 
recognize the judgment.149  The acknowledgment and application of 
general principles derived from the positive laws of the forum and other 
legal traditions can be the difference between applying a rule of law, and 
applying the rule of law.  While the former can waver with the shifting 
sands of political expediency (often to the detriment of the foreign litigant), 
the latter remains stubbornly constant. 
This combination of features is precisely what makes the “general 
principles of law” so special, and so relevant, to modern transnational 
disputes.  A court charged with applying a specific national law has both 
the duty and the authority to apply it as a whole.  This not only includes its 
black letter rules, but also the underlying principles that provide intent and 
direction to those rules.  These principles, then, reaffirm the correct result 
as a matter of that law, with no need to determine whether “better” national 
rules or the norms of international law should take precedence.150  The 
 
 146.  Id. at . 
 147.  First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S. 611, 
613 (1983) 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 150.  See Jan Paulsson, Unlawful Laws and the Authority of International Tribunals, 23 ICSID 
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outcome “is shown not to be an international imposition on [the applicable] 
national law,” but a “vibrant affirmation” of the very foundational core of 
that law, backed by the imprimatur of all “civilized nations, our peers.”  So 
while there is some overlap with traditional doctrines dealing with the 
exclusion of foreign law – like public policy – the application of general 
principles to guide the outcome of a transnational case is far less intrusive 
(and perhaps, when defined correctly, far less arbitrary151).  The otherwise 
applicable foreign law is not displaced and discarded as contrary to some 
parochial sense of “good morals [or] some deep-rooted tradition of the 
common weal” of the forum.152  Rather, it is applied in its fullest and fairest 
sense, checked by the international minimum standard.  This is also what 
differentiates general principles from applying uniform law instruments 
and lex mercatoria, which are non-state sources with little, if any, positive 
law footing.  But still, the benefit of these non-state sources of law is 
realized.  “General principles” allow judges to “play their proper role in 
ensuring that law does not present itself as a blank sheet of paper upon 
which any dictator or dominant group can write laws illegitimate within the 
legal order, and thereby debase law itself” – and the transnational 
commercial interests that depend upon it.  The legal “conscience,” 
therefore, remains constant. 
And that “conscience,” itself, is self-correcting.  Even absent the 
doctrines of stare decisis or binding precedent, it is “pointless to resist the 
observation” that judicial decisions help “generate norms of international 
law.”153  But if one municipal court or international tribunal characterizes a 
principle as one of general and universal applicability, the fallout from that 
observation should not be exaggerated.  It will not instantly bind other 
parties and states in their international affairs and disputes, or trigger an 
immediate wave of jurisprudential change as a new, formal rule of 
international law.  That decision will simply enter the fray of all 
international judicial decisions, where some shine as “bright[] beacons” 
 
Rev.—FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 215, 221-22 (2008). 
 151.  See, e.g., Davies v. Davies (1887), L. R. 36 C. D. 364 (Kekewich, J., )(“Public policy does 
not admit of definition and is not easily explained. It is a variable quantity; it must vary and does vary 
with the habits, capacities, and opportunities of the public.”); Besant v. Wood (1879), L. R. 12 C. D. 
620 (Jessel, M.R.) (“It is impossible to say what the opinion of a man or a Judge might be as to what 
public policy is.”) 
 152.  Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918).  See also World Duty 
Free Company Ltd. v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, ¶¶ 140, 147 (“Domestic 
courts generally refer to their own international public policy,” even though “some judgments” do refer 
to a “universal conception of public policy”). 
 153.  Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms, in TREATY 
ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 879 (2006) 
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and become norm-setting examples, while others “flicker and die near 
instant deaths.”154  This is a function of the “Darwinian” and non-
hierarchical system that permits those decisions that are unfit to be cast 
aside.  “Good [decisions] will chase the bad, and set standards which will 
contribute to a higher level of consistent quality.”155  Only if the decision is 
a good one, the characterization a defensible one, and the principle is 
indeed a universal one, will a new rule emerge. 
This is where judges and scholars come in.  In the realm of public 
international law, where the general principles were originally meant to 
apply, their development has long been stunted by the truncated reasoning 
of the international judge.  When the ICJ ‘finds’ and applies a general 
principle of law, it typically does so without any formal reference or 
label.156  And when it does name the source, it never publicizes its 
comparative process in divining the principle applied, but rather ipse dixit 
simply states that the principle is “admitted in all systems of law,”157 or that 
it is  “widely accepted as having been assimilated into the catalogue of 
general principles of law.”158  To be sure, and as Justice Ginsburg noted in 
Intel, the “comparison of legal systems is slippery business, and infinitely 
easier to state than to apply.”159  But difficulty cannot be allowed to excuse 
the entire exercise.160  Commentators have noted that “[i]t would be 
 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  See Jenks, Prospects of International Adjudication, pp. 268-305; Lauterpacht, Development, 
pp. 158-72. 
 157.  Corfu Channel Case (PCIJ) 
 158.  Sea-Land Servs. (PCIJ) 
 159.  Intel v. Advanced Micro Systems, 542 U.S. at 252. 
 160.  Indeed, at least one arbitration case was annulled for that very reason.  the proper explication 
of the relevant principle as one that is indeed grounded in the positive law of all municipal systems is 
essential.  The case of Klöckner v. Cameroon perhaps the best cautionary tale against the ipse dixit 
typically employed by the ICJ.  Award, 21 October 1983, 2 ICSID Reports 59-61; Decision on 
Annulment, 16 May 1986, 1 ICSID Reports 515.  In Klöckner, the applicable law was Cameroonian 
law, which in turn is based on French law.  Rather than discerning the content of the former, the 
Tribunal instead exclusively based its decision on the “basic principle” of “frankness and loyalty” that 
can be divined from “French civil law” (while noting without citation that this is also a “universal 
requirement” that inheres in all “other national codes which we know of” and both “English law and 
international law”).  On an application for annulment, the ad hoc Committee found that this truncated 
reasoning amounted to a failure to apply the proper law: “Does the ‘basic principle’ referred to by the 
Award . . . as one of ‘French civil law’ come from positive law, i.e., from the law’s body of rules? It is 
impossible to answer this question by reading the Award, which contains no reference whatsoever to 
legislative texts, to judgments, or to scholarly opinions. . . . [The Tribunal’s] reasoning [is] limited to 
postulating and not demonstrating the existence of a principle or exploring the rules by which it can 
only take concrete form.”  Accordingly, the Award was annulled because the Tribunal did not apply 
“the law of the Contracting State,” but instead  based its decision “more on a sort of general equity than 
on positive law . . . or precise contractual provisions.”  In other words, the Tribunal’s error was not in 
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welcomed not only by the parties but also by the international legal world” 
if the reasoning of the Court’s judgments were to explain how it had 
examined, by comparative methods, “the assertion that a general principle 
of law, having a specified meaning and significance, forms part of binding 
general international law.”161 
Perhaps the private international law world can do better.  In helping 
to determine the substance of municipal laws applied to the transnational 
scenario, private international law scholars and judges might be better 
suited, and better situated, to explicate this source of law beyond its current 
state of arcane lore.  Public international law scholars understandably spend 
their time hovering above the world’s municipal legal systems, descending 
to earth when they must but otherwise keeping a firm distance from the 
nuance of substantive and procedural rules, let alone the principles that 
underlie those rules.  Private international law scholars, on the other hand, 
draw from diverse pools of municipal law specialists, who spend their days 
toiling in the quagmire of transnational procedures, in the comparative 
search for common substantive rules.  And, after all, their reasoned work is 
another venerable source of international law – subsidiary, though 
complementary, to the general principles.162 
In much the same way, municipal courts are the most common forum 
for private international law matters and the primary source of decisions 
that hone future precedent in the field.  They may also be the most suitable 
courts to find and apply general principles of law.  International judicial 
bodies like the ICJ depend upon the consent of states for their jurisdiction 
and their legitimacy.  Its judges are understandably reluctant to find and 
expressly apply “new” substantive laws – especially those without a formal 
basis in state consent – lest they be accused of the unauthorized legislation 
of international law.  For investment tribunals, too, who are subject to 
review and annulment, this is a real worry.163  “The suspicion which states, 
especially those on the losing side, may entertain of indirect expansion of 
the scope of international law by a tribunal . . . no doubt largely accounts 
for the failure of the [international courts] . . . to make any significant use 
of this potentially very fertile source of development in international 
law.”164  Municipal courts, however, have far fewer worries.  With few 
 
resorting to the corrective and supplementary role of international law and general principles of law, but 
in not demonstrating the existence of concrete rules under that law as properly applied. 
 161.  Hermann Mosler, supra at 180. 
 162.  ICJ Statute, Art. 38(e) 
 163.  See supra n. 154. 
 164.  Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses Of “General Principles” In The Development Of 
International Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 280-81 
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exceptions around the world, their jurisdiction and legitimacy is relatively 
stable.  In the common law tradition, their discretion to resort to general 
principles to decide a transnational case before it is relatively unfettered.  In 
the civil law tradition, that discretion is commonly enshrined in a Code.  
So, somewhat ironically, the “courts of civilized nations” may be the best 
forum for the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” to 
take hold. 
* * * 
There is no sacred principle that pervades all decisions, and neither 
justice nor convenience is promoted by rigid adherence to any one principle 
as a means to effect justice between litigating parties.  And to be sure, the 
application of general principles is not a panacea for the promise of 
universal justice.  Judges are unlikely to exercise their authority to apply 
these principles very often.  Still, it is important for private international 
law as a discipline to see to it that judges know such authority exists; that 
they know the application of foreign (or forum) law includes the 
application of its foundational norms; and that they know where other 
courts have trodden before in doing the same.  The intent of this article is to 
open our mind’s door to a possible new frontier of private international 
law, and to be more than the “railway station” for transnational disputes. 
 
